SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE NINETIES, SEVENTIES STYLE:
CASE STUDIES IN THE PRESERVATION OF MALE
WORKPLACE NORMS
By
Michael Selmi*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1973, Sears Roebuck was sued by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission for discriminating against women by denying them positions in departments
that paid commissions.1 Nearly thirty years later, Wal-Mart, which for many Americans
had replaced Sears as the quintessential shopping destination, was sued for assigning
women to limited dead-end jobs without promotional possibilities.2 In both cases, the
companies defended the make-up of their workforce by claiming that the assignments
were based on women’s own preferences and that women generally lacked interest in
management positions.3 In the last decade, lawsuits nearly identical to that filed against
*
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Wal-Mart, and which challenge patterns like those at issue in the Sears case, have also
been initiated against Home Depot and many of the major grocery chains around the
country.4
In 1974, the brokerage firm Merrill Lynch was sued for sex discrimination for
refusing to hire women as brokers.5 The case settled shortly thereafter with a pledge by
the firm to hire more women for its broker positions.6 A quarter of a century later,
Merrill Lynch was again sued for failing to hire women as brokers, and consigning the
women it did hire to positions, primarily as sales associates, that typically did not lead to
management level jobs.7 As discussed in more detail below, similar lawsuits have been
filed in the last decade against many of the largest brokerage firms in the country.8
These cases, and many others, offer an important challenge to the reigning
consensus regarding the persistence of sex discrimination in the workplace. Currently
there is a widespread consensus, both in and outside of academia, that workplace
discrimination against women has both receded and changed substantially over the last
three decades. Virtually all significant discussions regarding discrimination now treat
discrimination as subtle, often unconscious in nature, and relatively free of animus or
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what is often described as an intent to discriminate. 9 The workplace barriers women
continue to experience are now more commonly attributed to their family commitments.10
A series of cases thathave arisen over the last decade casts doubt on th is portrait
of the workplace, and collectively suggest that discrimination remains a more powerful
force in labor markets than is typically acknowledged. These lawsuits have targeted
particular, and often entire, industries – securities, retail, restaurants and automobile –
suggesting that these industries remain mired in sex stereotypes that see women as
mothers who are marginal workers with their primary allegiance to be found outside of
the labor market or as infiltrartors who are infringing on the privilege and status male
workers have obtained. Contrary to the emphasis on subtle discrimination, there is rarely
anything subtle about the conduct in these cases; rather, all of the cases involve overt sex
discrimination, and at least for these industries, provide substantial insight into the
persistence of sex segregation and inequality for women.
By highlighting how these cases are inconsistent with the emphasis on subtle
discrimination, I do not mean to suggest that the subtle discrimination hypothesis is
wrong or even inaccurate; indeed, I have previously written about the importance and
effect of subtle discrimination in the workplace and I firmly believe that much of the
discrimination women face can be described as subtle, depending on how that term is
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For discussions of the changing nature of sex discrimination and the ways in which such
discrimination has become more subtle see VIRGINIA VALIAN, WHY SO SLOW? THE ADVANCEMENT OF
WOMEN (1998); Anne Lawton, The Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal Employment Opportunity,
85 MINN. L. REV. 587, 603-17 (2000); Barbara Reskin, Imagining Work Without Exclusionary Barriers, 14
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 313, 318-23 (2002); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination:
A Structural Approach, 101 COLUMBIA L. REV. 458, 469-89 (2001).
10
For a sampling of the extensive literature see ANITA ILTA GARVEY, WEAVING WORK AND
MOTHERHOOD (1999); JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER (2000).

3

used.11 Rather, what I mean to suggest is that there remains a significant amount of
discrimination in the workplace that cannot accurately be described as subtle but which
involves the active and conscious exclusion of women from the workplace, and that we
must remain focused on the entrenched nature of institutional sex discrimination if we are
to make further progress toward greater equality both in and outside of the workplace.
Although the class action cases are generally inconsistent with an emphasis on
subtle discrimination, they are consistent with a theory of sexual harassment that has
recently been developed by Professors Kathryn Abrams and Vicki Schultz.12 Under the
theories developed by these scholars, sexual harassment is less about sexual desire or
dominance and more about preserving male norms within the workplace. As will be
discussed in more detail shortly, this theory helps explain the underlying basis for these
class action cases, even for those cases that do not involve formal claims of sexual
harassment but are instead presented as classic cases of disparate treatment
discrimination. Even in the twenty-first century, many male workers, particularly in
certain industries that have traditionally been dominated by men, act in ways that are
intended to preserve their places by excluding or marginalizing women.
This article will be divided in two distinct sections. In section II, I will discuss
the set of cases that have arisen over the last decade in three areas: (1) securities
industry; (2) grocery industry and (3) class action sexual harassment cases. In section III,
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I will then offer some analysis of what these cases can tell us about the nature and
persistence of discrimination, and in section IV I will add some reflections on what these
cases mean for the way in which we think about sex discrimination in the future. I should
also add that this article is primarily intended as what I call a “reminder” paper, with the
reminder here being that intentional and overt discrimination remains a vital part of the
labor market.
II. THE CLASS ACTION SEX DISCRIMINATION CASES.
During the last decade there has been a sharp rise in prominent class action cases
alleging widespread patterns of discrimination.13 Many of the most prominent cases,
including those filed against Texaco and Coca-Cola, have involved allegations of race
discrimination,14 but there have also been a slew of cases challenging patterns of sex
discrimination within a variety of industries. The first major case, which arose in the
1980s, involved a challenge to the job assignments of the State Farm Insurance agency,
which had traditionally failed to hire women for positions as insurance agents. That case
settled for more than $150 million, and remains the largest settlement in a sex
discrimination case against a private party.15 Perhaps prompted by the success of the
State Farm case, similar cases have been filed challenging discriminatory assignment
practices in the securities and grocery industries.16 At about the same time, a series of
13
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class action sexual harassment cases have arisen that, as I will discuss in more detail
shortly, are closely related to the exclusionary practices that have been challenged in the
assignment cases. In this section, I will describe and detail the rise of class action
litigation in the securities and grocery industries, as well as the sexual harassment class
action cases.
1. The Securities Industry.
The securities industry has long been identified as an aggressive male-dominated
industry, and indeed, the popular image is not far from the mark. On the trading floor
and in Wall Street offices, macho behavior, including crude language and boorish
conduct, is often the norm.17 At the same time, the industry is not just a place to move
money but it is also a place where money can be made in droves, and women have long
been seeking their place in the industry. Over the last decade, women have gradually
infiltrated the securities industry, though they remain a substantial minority in all but the
least desirable clerical positions. As of 1996, approximately 15% of the more than
100,000 brokers nationwide were women, and women held fewer than 8% of the
positions at the level of Vice President or above.18 This modest infiltration of women,
however, has not transformed the workplace, which remains deeply male and often
deeply abusive.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, female brokers have initiated a slew of lawsuits
alleging various forms of discrimination, including the failure to promote women, the

in the law firm is also involved in the case against Wal-Mart, which is being handled by a consortium of
attorneys.
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There is an extensive literature chronicling the behavior that prevails on Wall Street. See, e.g.,
FRANK PARTNOY, F.I.A.S.C.O: THE INSIDE STORY OF A WALL STREET TRADER (1998). For an earlier
version detailing the world of investment banking see MICHAEL LEWIS, LIAR’S POKER (1989).
18
See Michael Siconolfi & Margaret A. Jacobs, Wall Street Fails to Stem Rising Claims of Sex
Harassment and Discrimination, WALL ST. J., May 24, 1996, at C1.
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failure to train or mentor women, pervasive sexual harassment, including quid pro quo
harassment where male bosses were seeking sexual favors for employment prerequisites.
Few of the major firms have been able to escape the allegations, and more lawsuits are
likely forthcoming.19 What is equally clear, although all but one of the cases has settled,
the allegations all appear to have been substantiated at least to some significant degree.
Indeed, most of the firms did not deny the substance of the allegations; rather, their
defenses, to the extent defenses were mounted, contended that the practices were not as
pervasive as alleged.20
Likely the best known of the cases was also the first to be filed against the firm
that was then known as Smith, Barney, an old line firm that has since become part of the
conglomerate Travelers, Inc. Initially filed in 1996, the case alleged that the company
systematically discriminated against women in hiring, assignments, pay and promotions,
as well as through pervasive sexual harassment.21 According to the allegations, only five
percent of Smith Barney’s brokers were women, and less than two percent of its branch
managers were women. The company, on the other hand, claimed that women accounted
for 13% of its brokers, and just over 2% of its branch managers.22 The lead plaintiff in
the case, Pamela Martens, was a 50-year old women who had worked at the firm for ten
years and who managed $187 million for the company, but who was fired two days after
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she complained about discriminatory behavior in her New Jersey office and retained an
attorney to pursue her complaints.23
More women joined the lawsuit shortly after it was filed and the case was
eventually certified as a class action consisting of more than 20,000 past and former
employees. Many of the allegations have now become commomplace in the securities
cases. In particular, the plaintiffs alleged that they were systematically excluded from
lucrative broker jobs and instead channeled into low-paying positions as sales
assistants.24 Those women who became brokers were typically denied the most
important accounts, received little to no mentoring, and were subjected to gross and
extensive harassment.25 The case became best known for what was described as a “boom
boom” room -- a room that was located in the basement of the Garden City, New York
office where male brokers would go at the end of the day to drink from a garbage can and
from which women were excluded.26 At that same office, women were ordered to wear
short skirts and strippers were a frequent accompaniment for the male brokers and some
of their clients,27 and one of the managers wore a gun strapped to his ankle while the
branch manager occasionally brandished his own gun in the office.28
As a legal matter, the case also became important as a challenge to the mandatory
arbitration proceedings that had been instituted by the brokerage houses for all of their
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MEDIATION REP. 147 (1996).
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employees.29 The class action allegations were seen as a way around the arbitration
proceedings, and ultimately the case was settled in a manner that allowed members of the
plaintiff class to avoid the mandatory proceedings in favor of a more neutral arbitration
forum.30 Under the settlement, more than 1900 women filed complaints, the vast
majority of whom were former employees.31 Most of the claims were successfully settled
for amounts that were not disclosed. However, under the arbitration system established
pursuant to the settlement, one broker recently received an award of $3.2 million,
including $1.5 million in punitive damages as a penalty for the company’s tolerance of
pervasive sexual harassment.32 In addition to the individual relief, the settlement required
Smith Barney to spend $15 million toward various diversity initiatives, including
training.33
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Dec. 4, 1998, at C1.
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See Debra Baker, Tangled Up in Ticker Tape, ABA JOURNAL, Dec. 1999, at 44. Thirteen hundred of
the claimants settled without going through the arbitration process. See Gary Weiss, A Settlement That’s
Not Settled, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 30, 2000, at 164. Another 38 members opted out of the settlement,
including the lead plaintiff and a collateral proceeding began that was designed to challenge the terms of
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See Randall Smith, Salomon is Told to Pay Broker $3.2 Million, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2002, at C1.
In contrast, the first woman to go through the arbitration system lost her claim and obtained no relief. See
Robert Trigaux, Up Against the Wall, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 24, 2003, at 1E.
33
See Patrick McGeehan, Judge Approves Class-Action Settlement for Sex Harassment at Smith Barney,
WALL ST. J., July 27, 1998, at A4 (discussing settlement terms).
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One year after the Smith Barney case was filed, a similar class action claim was
initiated against Merrill Lynch, which at the time of the lawsuit was the nation’s largest
brokerage firm with more than 13,000 brokers.34 As noted earlier, Merrill Lynch had
actually been sued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for discrimination
against women twenty years earlier.35 The 1974 case was settled with a pledge by Merrill
Lynch to hire more women for a five-year period, but the company never met the targets
that were established as part of that settlement and no one ever seemed to notice.36 By
the time the suit was filed in 1996, 5.8% of Merrill Lynch’s brokers were women, about
the same percentage that had existed in 1990.37
Although the salacious harassment claims that had been a central part of the
Smith Barney case were absent in the action against Merrill Lynch, the substance of the
underlying claims was nearly identical. The class action alleged that women were
systematically discriminated against in pay and promotions largely by the subjective way
in which business was channeled to male brokers.38 As was true of Smith Barney, and
the other cases that were filed, the women also contended that they had been excluded
from golf and strip club outings with clients, and that the company typically viewed its
female employees as secondary earners.39 For example, one of the lead plaintiffs, an
experienced broker with an MBA, was asked during her interview how much money her
34

See Ann Wozencraft, Bias at the Bull: Merrill Lynch’s Class Action Settlement Draws a Crowd, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 1999, at C1.
35
See note 5 supra.
36
See Noelle Knox, Wall Street Battles Sexual Bias Even as Brokerage Industry Fights Discrimination,
USA TODAY, Sept. 15, 2000, at 1B (noting that Merrill Lynch had agreed to a goal of having women
constitute 16% of all new hires annually but that “[t]wenty years later, Merrill Lynch had not yet reached
the target”).
37
See Ann Wozencraft, Bias at the Bull: Merrill Lynch’s Class Action Settlement Draws a Crowd, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 1999, at C1.
38
Id. (“Among [the plaintiffs’] chief concerns are how accounts from departing workers, walk-ins, leads
and referrals are distributed.”). See also Cremin v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F.
Supp. 1460, 1464 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
39
See Susan E. Reed, Taking the Bull By the Horns, AMER. PROSPECT, Aug. 14, 2000, at 34-35.

10

husband made.40 At a firm meeting of more than 100 female brokers, it was discovered
that none of the women present had been chosen to participate in a new program aimed at
generating new investor accounts.41 The lead plaintiff in the case, Marybeth Cremin,
alleged that her supervisor made disparaging remarks about her status as a working
mother, and told her that she would be more successful if she divorced her husband.42
When Cremin returned to work after a maternity leave, she was ordered to surrender all
of her accounts and she was promptly fired.43
One year after the case was filed, the parties settled on terms that were much like
those adopted in the Smith Barney case, with the important exception that Merrill Lynch
did not commit any funds to diversity efforts.44 Of the 22,000 member class, it was
determined that 2,700 individuals were eligible to file claims, and more than 900 (one of
three) ultimately did.45 The company settled most of the claims for amounts that
reportedly ranged from $20,000 to $40,000.46
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Id. at 35.
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39.
46
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C16.
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Table One
Securities Class Action Defendants
1993-2002
American Express Financial
Gruntal Corp.
Lew Lieberman
Merrill Lynch
Morgan Stanley
Olde Discount
Smith Barney
US Bancorp Piper Jaffrey

As indicated in Table One, other cases with similar allegations abound.
Following on the heels of the Merrill Lynch settlement, two cases were filed against
American Express and Morgan Stanley. The American Express case, which also
included allegations of age discrimination, alleged systemic discrimination against
women who applied for or attained the position of financial advisor.47 Like the other
cases, the plaintiffs also alleged discrimination in assignments, training and mentoring as
a result of sex stereotyping, namely that women were not as aggressive as men.48 The
case settled for $31 million and a series of proposed reforms, including new means of
distributing accounts to its employees.49 In contrast, rather than settling its case, Morgan
Stanley is currently embroiled in class action litigation with private plaintiffs assisted by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which has also filed a claim for sex
discrimination against the company.50 One of the lead plaintiffs in the Morgan Stanley
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See Kosen v. American Express Financial Advisors, Civil Action No. 01:02CV0082 (D.D.C. 2001), ¶
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Id. at ¶ 30.
See David Phelps, Judge Approves Amex Settlement in Sex, Age-Discrimination Lawsuit, Star
Tribune, June 18, 2002, at 3D; Jerry Markon & Jill Carroll, Financial Firm Agrees to Settle Bias Lawsuit,
Feb. 21, 2002, WALL ST. J., at A3.
50
See Charles Gasparino & Gaston F. Ceron, EEOC Joins Wall Street Sex-Bias Suit, WALL ST. J., Sept.
11, 2001, at C1.
49
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case was a high-ranking woman with an annual salary that exceeded $1 million a year
and who was fired shortly after she complained about not being promoted to a managing
partner position.51 Similar cases or claims of system-wide discrimination have also been
filed against Olde Securities, US Bancorp, Lew Lieberman and Gruntal Co., and large
individual cases that have the potential to expand to class actions have been filed against
ING Barings, JP Morgan, and Kidder Peabody, the latter of which involved claims
originally filed in 1993.52
Although it is always difficult to draw definitive conclusions from settled cases, it
is not too much to suggest that these cases, in both their volume and size, describe an
industry that remains resistant to change and hostile to women. Equally clear, the
lawsuits do not appear to have brought fundamental change. In 2001, only 15% of the
brokers were women and women held 12.2% of the branch manager positions.53 At
Merrill Lynch, despite its recent lawsuit, women’s representation among brokers has
increased from 15 to 16%, or just one percent higher than the original goal from its 1974
lawsuit.54
2. The Grocery Industry.
The grocery industry employs more than three million individuals, and remains
one of the few large industries where employees can earn decent wages with substantial
51

See Patrick McGeehan, Wall Street Highflier to Outcast: A Woman’s Story, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb.
10, 2002, at C1.
52
See Kate Kelly, Floor Gover at Big Board Claims Sex Bias at ING Barings, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11,
2001, at C1; Patrick McGeehan, Duo Pursues Sex-Bias Cases on Wall Street, WALL ST. J., May 14, 1997,
at C1 (Olde Discount); Leon Nathans Spiro, The Angry Voices at Kidder, BUS. WK., Feb. 1, 1993, at 60;
Benjamin Weiner, Three Women Accuse Investment Concern of Sexual Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, April 29,
1997, at B4 (Lex Lieberman); Former Employee Files Lawsuit Charging J.P. Morgan Securities with Bias,
N.Y. TIMES, April 11, 2001, at C13; Thomas J. Mulligan, EEOC Sues Brokerage in Gender Bias Cases,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2001, at C1 (noting case was seeking class action status).
53
See Securities Industry Association, Report on Diversity Strategy, Development and Demographics
12 (2001).
54
See Reed, supra note 39, at 36 (“In 1996, when Cremin began her lawsuit, only 15% of the financial
consultants at the firm were female . . . Today only 16 percent are female.”)
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promotional possibilities without possessing a college degree. 55 Promotions to managers
have traditionally arisen internally, rather than from an external labor market, and
historically both the meat and produce departments have been the most desirable
positions because they are the most profitable departments and offer the greatest
promotional opportunities. More recently, grocery stores have expanded their offerings
and many now offer bakeries and delicatessans, although these departments, largely
because they are new, are not typically part of the ladder to management. Not
surprisingly, men dominate the meat and produce departments, while women tend to be
concentrated in the bakery and delicatessen departments.
Publix is Florida’s largest grocery store chain, and the largest privately owned
supermarket chain in the United States with sales of more than $10 billion in 1996.56 The
store has long been admired for its operations, and has consistently been included on lists
of the “best places to work” in America and it is equally well known for its high
customer service.57 Publix, however, also has a history of hostility toward women,
particularly in its management practices. In 1978, Publix printed and distributed
brochures opposing the Equal Rights Amendment, and as late as 1994, its evaluation
form for managers asked, “Family Status (does wife work?).”58
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In 1992, the EEOC began investigating charges of gender and race discrimination
at Publix stores, and three years later eight women filed suit against the grocery chain
alleging that Publix discriminated against them on the basis of their sex. 59 The plaintiffs,
represented by the premier employment discrimination firm Saperstein, Goldstein,
Demchak and Baller and by two Tallahassee lawyers, obtained class certification for their
suit in March of 1996, with the class consisting of more than 100,000 female
management and non-management employees at Publix who had worked for the
company since 1991.60 The primary class allegation was that Publix had engaged in sex
stereotyping by systematically channeling women into low-wage, dead-end jobs that
would not lead to the higher paying, male-dominated management positions.61 The
women claimed that they were kept in cashier and deli positions while men were placed
in management-track stock and clerk positions.62 To build their case, the plaintiffs’
lawyers relied primarily on statistical evidence – statistics that were compiled by
representatives of the plaintiffs who walked into stores to observe the photographs Publix
posted of its managers. The portraits provided a compelling picture of sex
discrimination. A union representative who took part in the store visits explained, “My
God, you’d go in the stores and you didn’t need a clipboard to write down what you saw.
It was all white guys on those pictures.”63
Ultimately, the plaintiffs compiled an impressive statistical case. Relying on
EEOC and Census Bureau statistics, the plaintiffs’ lawyers claimed that although women
59

Id. In November, the EEOC sought permission to join the action, and by December, the number of
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60
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61
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63
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held forty percent of all supermarket management positions nationwide, women
accounted for only twenty-one percent of Publix’s management positions.64 Moreover,
the women who did make it into management for Publix tended to manage the
delicatessen department, a position that was 90% female and was, not coincidentally,
among the lowest paying of management positions, and one that traditionally did not lead
to more substantial management positions.65 Publix also required its store managers to
have experience working as a stock person, and its meat managers to have worked as
meat cutters, positions women had long been discouraged from seeking.66 In 1994, only
3 of the 456 (0.6%) meat department managers were women, with 11 (2.4%) female
produce managers; in contrast, 390 of the 433 (90%) deli managers were women.67 This
allegation followed a pattern established in other grocery store litigation where it was
determined that women managers were concentrated in newer departments such as the
bakery and delicatessen, whereas men dominated the traditional departments of meat and
produce from which most promotions were made.68 Plaintiffs also maintained that, as a
result of sex stereotyping, full-time male employees earned on average 35% more than
full-time female employees.69
According to the plaintiffs, one primary reason for the segregated workforce was
that the decision making process regarding promotions and entry-level placement was
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largely subjective.70 Job openings were not posted at Publix, rather managers
subjectively determined who should apply for upper-level positions and passed the
information along by what was described as a “tap on the shoulder” system.71 Managers
were not provided with any written guidelines on promotions or initial placements but
instead had total discretion to steer new workers into gender stereotyped positions. It was
also alleged that managers exercised their discretion regarding who received what
training in a similarly discriminatory manner.
Publix did not dispute the statistics but instead sought to explain the disparities as
a product of women’s preferences. The company maintained that the discrepancy in
hiring and promotion was due to the fact that male applicants were more likely to have
prior experience in stock and clerk positions and that women chose dead-end jobs
because those jobs often had better hours and did not require relocating.72 Company
officials made similar statements during the course of the litigation seeking to link the
store assignments to women’s interests in balancing their family and work
commitments.73
After a lengthy mediation, Publix settled the case in early 1997 for $81.5 million
dollars, one of the largest settlements of its kind.74 The settlement also included a series
of planned changes in their employment practices, including creating minimum
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requirements for store-level jobs, and establishing a job candidate pool so that those
interested in pursuing other positions could do so.75 The company also agreed to fill
store jobs with a number of women proportionate to those who apply, agreed to provide
employees with new employment training and job advancement programs, but did not
agree to post job openings.76 One of the interesting sidenotes from the case is that the
firm never seemed to suffer a loss of business from the lawsuit even though women
constituted a majority of its shoppers.77
Although the Publix case was the most recent of the large class action cases, it
was typical of a series of lawsuits that have been filed against grocery chains around the
country during the last decade. The largest of the cases, and the only one to have a
published decision on liability,78 involved a suit filed against the Western chain known as
Lucky’s, now owned by American Stores, which ultimately settled in the early 1990s for
$107 million.79 A New York Times story summarized the allegations in the case in this
way: “The women said they were channeled into dead-end jobs, either working the cash
registers or in relatively new departments like bakeries and delicatessens, rather than in
the main grocery and produce sections at the core of most supermarket operations, where
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jobs are generally better paid and can lead to promotions.”80 Like Publix, the case
against Lucky’s was replete with comments from management regarding women’s lack
of “drive,” their unwillingness to work long hours because of the child responsibilities
and fears that the public might react negatively to women in management positions.81 In
addition to the lawsuit against Lucky’s, similar lawsuits were filed against Safeway,
Albertson’s and Save Mart, all of which were premised on similar assignment patterns
and all of which settled relatively quickly.82
The case against Lucky’s, and several other West Coast chains, began in the mid1980s with suits originally initiated by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.83 The allegations and defenses in those cases were identical to those made
in the more recent cases. Upon the filing of the first lawsuits, one of the initial
defendants stated that promotional opportunities required transferring from store to store,
and women were not interested in relocating, the very same defense used in the Publix
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case.84 Women were also said to have “chosen” checker positions because of their
“flexibility.”85
Table Two
Grocery Store ClassAction Defendants
1990-2002
Albertson’s
Dominic’s
Ingles Markets
Kash-n-Karry
Kohl’s
Lucky Stores
Publix
Safeway
Save Mart
Winn Dixie

Despite the bevy of lawsuits, it is equally clear that the pattern of discrimination
within the grocery industry remains today, some twenty years after the initial suits were
filed. In the late 1990s, cases alleging sex discrimination along the same lines as those
discussed above were filed against a Midwestern chain, Kohl’s Markets, and a North
Carolina-based chain, Ingles markets.86 Like Publix, the Ingles case was premised on the
“visual inspection” technique of reviewing photographs of the managers posted in the
stores, which demonstrated that men occupied all of the management positions in the 39
stores that were surveyed.87 Dominick’s markets based in Chicago was sued in 1995 and
subsequently settled their case for more than $7 million, and in 1999, the Florida chain
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Winn-Dixie settled a race and sex discrimination claim for $33 million the raised similar
claims.88
In addition to the grocery store cases, several other large retailers have been
targeted for similar discriminatory practices. In 1996, Home Depot was hit with two
class action cases that alleged that women were systematically assigned to cashier
positions rather than working on the sales floor from which promotions were typically
made.89 Several years later, and on the eve of trial, Home Depot settled the cases for
more than $100 million.90 More recently, Wal-Mart was the subject of what is likely to
be the largest class action case of its kind when it was sued by a consortium of attorneys
for sex-segregated assignments and promotions.91 The suit against Wal-Mart, the
nation’s largest retailer, and largest private employer in the country, alleges that WalMart relies on sex-stereotyping for its assignments and promotions, largely due to its
failure to post job openings and instead relying on subjective employment practices by its
male-dominated management.92
3. Sexual Harassment Class Actions.
Many of the securities and grocery store cases included allegations of sexual
harassment; the Smith Barney case, in particular, gained much of its notoriety for its
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infamous boom boom room and other allegations of harassment of female employees.93
But the last decade has also seen the rise of class action sexual harassment cases, a cause
of action that had previously not been recognized and one that remains controversial.94
The best known of these cases involved the claims filed against the Japanese
automobile manufacturer, Mitsubishi, stemming from the practices at its plant in the
ironically named Normal, Illinois. The initial suit, filed on behalf of 29 women in 1994,
alleged a pattern of harassment that included sexual abuse, lewd remarks and other forms
of discrimination.95 As many as 400 male employees at the 3800 worker plant were
accused of taking part in the harassment. Several years later, the EEOC filed its first ever
class action sexual harassment suit contending that as many as 400 of the 940 women
who had worked at the plant had been subjected to a hostile working environment.96
When built in the 1980s, the Mitsubishi plant offered a rare opportunity for highpaying jobs in what was an otherwise depressed economy. The jobs at the plant paid on
average nearly $50,000, with many skilled jobs paying as much as $100,000 when
overtime was factored in.97 These were, without question, the best paying jobs for miles
around. Most of the workers at the plant were represented by the United Auto Workers,
93
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although the union contract made various concessions to Mitsubishi’s Japanese
management and team concept, including the elimination of a standard clause that created
a committee to resolve harassment claims.98 As a result, the claims of sexual harassment
at the plant were left to an indifferent management to address.
Both suits alleged a pervasive pattern of harassment that ran throughout the plant.
A journalistic account described the allegations in this way:
As early as 1992, female employees at Mitsubishi began to
complain of sexual misbehavior on the factory floor. They reported
obscene, crude sketches of genital organs and sex acts, and names of
female workers scratched into unpainted car bodies moving along
the assembly line. Women were called sluts, whores and bitches
and subjected to groping, forced sex play and male flashing.
Explicit sexual graffiti such as KILL THE SLUT MARY were
scrawled on rest-area and bathroom walls. In a particularly
egregious case, a worker put his air gun between a woman’s legs
and pulled the trigger. Declared a line supervisor: “I don’t want any
bitches on my line. Women don’t belong in the plant.99
Such behavior was so much the norm that when EEOC representatives visited the plant to
conduct an investigation, no one had even bothered to remove the explicit sexual grafitti
that lined the walls.100 Unwanted sexual advances from co-workers and supervisors were
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common, and strippers and prostitutes were hired to entertain at company parties when
Japanese officials visited.101
After initially mounting an aggressive campaign to rebut the charges, Mitsubishi
ultimately settled both claims for substantial sums. The private lawsuit was settled for
$9.5 million102 and shortly thereafter, the EEOC settled its lawsuit for $34 million and the
imposition of a three-year monitoring group that was empowered to recommend
necessary changes in employment practices.103 Under the EEOC’s suit, which remains
the largest award in a sexual harassment case to date, more than 300 women recovered
sums ranging from $25,000 to $300,000 with an average of approximately $100,000.104
Despite these settlements, a lengthy report in the New York Times questioned how much
the plant had really changed, suggesting that once the case was settled and removed from
the public’s eyes, there was little interest on the part of the company or the plaintiffs in
pursuing substantial reform.105
Although Mitsubishi is the largest and best known case, Ford Motors has
struggled with similar allegations over the last few years, even though its struggles have
rarely captured national attention. The initial allegations were focused on two plants
outside of Chicago, and raised claims that were much like those directed at Mitsubishi – a
gauntlet of harassment for Ford’s female employees on the factory floor including
unwanted sexual advances, groping, name calling and visible pornography.106 Strippers
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and prostitutes also apparently made the rounds at the Ford plants.107 Ford eventually
settled four separate lawsuits – three involving allegations of harassment, and one for
denying women entry-level jobs in seven of its assembly plants.108 In addition to the
claims against Mitsubishi and Ford, the EEOC also initiated, and later settled, class action
sexual harassment claims against Astra Pharmaceuticals and Dial Corporation. The Astra
claim settled quickly for $10 million and led to the dismissal of its Chief Executive,109
whereas the Dial case recently settled for the same amount but only on the eve of trial
after four years of contentious litigation.110
The cases just mentioned represent the largest and latest of the class action sexual
harassment claims but the first to attain class action status involved charges of pervasive
harassment at a mining company in northern Minnesota. As was true with the Mitsubishi
case, the mining jobs were the best jobs available in the rural area of Northern Minnesota
where the mine was located. The case against Eveleth Mines began in 1984 when three
female miners filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The
107
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case was subsequently certified as a class action in 1991.111 The case involved an all too
familiar litany of harassment– groping, grabbing, stalking, pressure for sex, use of sexual
language and pornography, men exposing themselves and masturbating on women’s
clothes. One young boy testified that he watched his mother pack her lunch each day,
including a knife, mace and rope to tie the door shut in her work area.112
Unlike the other cases, the Eveleth Mines case went to trial, and the testimony at
the trial painted a picture of a workplace defiantly hostile to women. Testimony
indicated that the personnel director would frequently comment that women belonged at
home and pregnant, and that the union consciously decided to ignore the complaints so as
to protect its male members.113 After the initial complaints were filed, a sign went up on
a manager-controlled bulletin board that read, “Sexual harassment will not be reported,
but it will be graded.”114 When the women employees asked for a portable bathroom
near the mine, their request was refused as they were told that if they were to work like a
man they would have to learn to “piss like a man.”115 Further testimony confirmed the
plaintiffs’ allegations, and the plaintiffs ultimately prevailed in the lengthy trial.116
But the case did not end there. The damages phase was assigned to a retired
judge who appeared hostile to the plaintiffs throughout the proceedings, and ultimately
awarded paltry amounts to the individual plaintiffs. His decision, however, was reversed
111
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by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, which remanded the damages phase for a jury
trial.117 Just before that trial was set to begin, the individual plaintiffs settled with the
lead plaintiff receiving more than $750,000, compared to the $25,000 award the judge
had ordered for her.118 Although ultimately victorious in the case, the lead plaintiff, Lois
Jenson, went on permanent disability and has not worked since 1992.119
III. THE PERSISTENCE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION.
What do these, and other, cases tell us about the persistence of sex
discrimination in the workplace? On the one hand, these cases may be seen as a random
collection of thirty or so cases that offer little meaning in the context of the broader labor
market. From this perspective, the cases might be seen as reflecting isolated incidents
rather than entrenched patterns, which was precisely the defense raised in many of the
cases.120 To be sure, this is hardly a scientific or statistical survey, and yet, it would be a
mistake to dismiss these cases as abberational in nature. Indeed, a desire to dismiss the
cases likely reflects the very societal perception regarding the persistence of
discrimination that these cases directly challenge. In other words, these cases appear
abberational, or isolated, not because they are but because they fail to comport with our
image of the changing nature of discrimination. As a society, we have plainly concluded,
long ago, that cases of overt exclusion have all but vanished from the workplace.121 But
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as I discuss further below, our perceptions of discrimination may have changed far more
than the reality of discrimination, and there is certainly strong reason to believe that
intentional and overt discrimination remains a substantial barrier to workplace equality
for women.
These cases are also important in that they provide some of the best available
evidence regarding the persistence of discrimination. When it comes to understanding
the persistence of gender inequality, both economics and sociology, where these issues
are studied extensively, have turned to empirical analyses. Yet, it is extremely difficult to
establish discrimination through empirical studies, which is, I think, one reason why
discrimination tends to exist at the margins in theories premised on empirical analysis.
Outside of controlled studies that seek to match pairs on all relevant factors other than
sex, identifying discrimination through empirical studies often proves elusive. The
match-paired studies, such as have recently been conducted with restaurants and
orchestras,122 offer significant evidence of labor market discrimination, although even
these studies are not without their critics.123 These studies, however, are difficult to
conduct and few in number. More commonly, an empirical study will seek to measure
some other variable, such as the role of labor market experience in explaining gender
122
See Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind” Auditions
on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715 (2000); David Neumark,Sex Discrimination in Restaurant
Hiring: An Audit Study, 111 Q. J. ECON. 915 (1996). The Goldin and Rouse study found that female
musicians had a far greater likelihood of being hired if they auditioned behind a curtain, then when they
were visible to the evaluators. Many major orchestras have moved to having musicians audition behind a
blind curtain to avoid any distinguishing characteristics other than their music, and the Goldin and Rouse
study took advantage of the data that existed both before and after these changes in practice. The Neumark
study, on the other hand, was patterned on housing audit studies, and he had men and women with identical
resumes apply for positions at restaurants in the Philadelphia area. This study found that male resumes led
to approximately three times as many interviews and five times as many job offers at high priced
restaurants. See id. at 933-36. These studies are discussed at length in Christine Jolls, Is There a Glass
Ceiling? 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (2002).
123
For a discussion on the limits of testing audits, frequently used to document housing discrimination
and more recently adapted in other areas see James J. Heckman, Detecting Discrimination, 12 J. OF ECON.
PERSP. 101 (1998).
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inequities, and treat discrimination as an “unexplained variable,” one that remains as a
background possibility but thatis solidly in the background nonetheless. For example,
many studies have sought to explain the wage gap between men and women, and
typically look to differences in experience or education to explain the observed pay
disparities.124 These studies uniformly fail fully to explain the disparities but it is rare
that a researcher will identify discrimination as the cause of the unexplained portion of
the wage gap, principally because the study was not set up to measure discrimination but
was instead designed to measure the influence of tenure or education on labor market
patterns.125 As a result, empirical studies are generally not intended to measure
discrimination, leaving case studies as some of the best availableevidence of the
discrimination that remains in the workplace.
This short discussion highlights another common and important problem with
identifying discrimination. When it comes to discrimination, and this is true of both race
and sex discrimination, in and out of court, our standards of proof are extremely high.
Rather than establishing discrimination as the underlying cause by a preponderance of the
evidence, we typically require a level of proof that eliminates all other potential causes.
As a result, the cases discussed in this article provide as potent evidence of ongoing
124
For a sampling of the rich literature see FRANCINE D. BLAU ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF WOMEN,
MEN, AND WORK 134-43 (3d ed. 1998); Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, Swimming Upstream:
Trends in the Gender Wage Differential in the 1980s, 15 J. LAB. ECON. 1 (1997); Linda Datcher Loury, The
Gender Earnings Gap Among College-Educated Workers, 50 INDUS. & LABOR REL. REV. 580 (1997). I
have discussed the literature and its limitations in Michael Selmi, Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap,
78 N.C. L. REV. 708, 714-30 (2000).
125
Christine Jolls, who is sympathetic to identifying discrimination in these studies, comments, “The
difficulty with the evidence here is that it is difficult to be sure that all non-sex differences – some of which
may be subtle or difficult to observe – have been controlled for, and, unless all such differences have been
controlled for, the residual cannot properly be attributed to sex.” Jolls, supra note 122, at 11 (footnote
omitted). See also Van W. Kolpin & Larry D. Singell, Jr., The Gender Composition & Scholarly
Performance of Economics Departments: A Test for Employment Discrimination, 49 INDUS. & LABOR REL.
Rvw. 408 (1996) (finding that female economists had published more than their male counterparts even
though they tended to be hired at lower ranked schools but avoiding the conclusion that discrimination
explained the discrepancy because not all other explanations had been eliminated).

29

discrimination as we are likely to find, and they should not be discounted because of the
lack of supporting empirical data.126 In the end, the cases that percolate through the
courts are often our best evidence of the persistence of discrimination.
A. The Subtle Discrimination Hypothesis.
As noted earlier, these cases tell a story that differs substantially from the
consensual story regarding the nature of contemporary discrimination. The consensual
story emphasizes how discrimination has become more subtle in nature, less overt, and
often has to do with women’s childcare commitments, or more commonly, with an
employer’s perceptions of a woman’s childcare commitments.127 In this story, there is
also a blurring of lines as to what constitutes discrimination, particularly when the focus
is on what is often defined as unconscious discrimination, or alternatively, on the balance
many women seek to draw between their work and family obligations that may limit their
labor market commitments. With respect to unconscious discrimination, the actor is
generally thought to have no desire to discriminate and is generally thought to be
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Subjective interviews – asking those who are potential victims about their experiences – offer
another possible means of identifying discrimination, and interviews with potential victims are frequently
conducted. See, e.g., Janet Rosenberg et al, Now That We Are Here: Discrimination, Disparagement, and
Harassment at Work and the Experience of Women Lawyers, 7 GENDER & SOCIETY 415 (1993) (reporting
results of survey of female lawyers’ perception of discrimination); Patricia Yancey Martin et al., Gender
Bias and Feminist Consciousness Among Judges and Attorneys: A Standpoint Theory Analysis, 27 SIGNS
665 (2002) (study of perceptions of discrimination among Florida Bar members). However, these studies
often fail to provide convincing information for the subject groups are small and frequently left on their
own to define discrimination, or are provided a definition of discrimination, which may not comport with
what a court would identify as discrimination. Subjective interviews can serve important purposes, but like
all of the various methods. they have their limits.
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See, eg., VIRGINIA VALIAN, supra note 9; JOAN WILLIAMS, supra note 10. Joan Waldfogel has
published a series of studies documenting the disparity in pay between women with children and those
without, and suggested that improving public policies designed to facilitate childrearing may go a long
ways toward reducing the pay disparities. See Jane Waldfogel, The Family Gap for Young Women in the
United States and Britain: Can Maternity Leave Make a Difference? 16 J. LAB. ECON. 505 (1998); Jane
Waldfogel, Understanding the “Family Gap” for Women With Children, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 137 (1998);
Jane Waldfogel, Family-Friendly Policies for Families with Young Children, 5 EMPL. RTS. & EMLOY.
POL’Y J. 273 (2001).
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unaware of the way in which his acts adversely affect women.128 The recent turn within
law to focus on women’s role as caretakers, and the ways in which society ought to give
primacy to that role, suggests that many of the observed labor market inequities arise
from women’s dual roles as mothers and labor market participants.129 This is certainly
not a new issue and indeed the tension between women’s roles as workers and mothers
has long been embodied in our nation’s social policy, which has tended towards
protecting and defining women as mothers.130
The cases discussed in this paper offer a different picture: there was nothing
subtle about the discrimination in any of the cases, nor was the discrimination tied to
women’s childcare responsibilities. Instead the cases represent the kind of behavior that
many had previously defined out of existence in today’s labor market: overt acts of
hostility and exclusion based on stereotypes regarding women’s proper roles or abilities
128

The two most influential and insightful articles on what is sometimes referred to as unconscious
discrimination are Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995) and Charles R.
Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 317 (1987). For additional recent discussions see Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype:
Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1241 (2002); Martha Chamallas, Defining
the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747 (2001);
TIMOTHY D. WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES: DISCOVERING THE ADAPTIVE UNCONSCIOUS (2002).
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See WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 65-77. The recent focus on caretaking develops an argument that
has an antecedent in neoclassical economics, which has long sought to explain observed labor market
inequalities based on women’s roles in the home. For classic statements of this position see GARY S.
BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 41-42 (1991) (“Wage rates are lower for women a least partly
because they invest less than men in market human capital, while the productivity in household time is
presumably greater for women partly because they invest more than men in household capital.”); Solomon
William Polachek, Occupational Self-Selection: A Human Capital Approach to Sex Differences in
Occupational Structure, 63 REV. ECON. & STAT. 60, 65-68 (1981) (arguing that women self-select into
occupations that match their preferences). Although there are similarities between the neoclassical
argument and the focus on caretaking, the differences are more profound. In particular, the caretaking
literature seeks to identify ways to remedy the penalties women suffer, while the neoclassical position does
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specialization.
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For an excellent historical overview of the gendered vision that has influenced social policy see
ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC
CITIZENSHIP IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2001). Kessler-Harris writes: “[T]he use of the family to
justify and rationalize women’s disadvantaged workforce position functions as a set of ideological and
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male as well as female experience.” Id. at 12 (footnote omitted).
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in the workplace. In both the securities and grocery industry cases, the employers based
their policies on a presumption that women were less committed to the workplace and
were less interested in pursuing career paths that would lead to power and influence but
that would also seemingly require intense devotion. Importantly, these assumptions were
not grounded in fact; no studies had been conducted by any of the companies to
document women’s interests nor did the companies provide any hard evidence that their
assumptions were true. Rather, the company’s assumptions were based on management’s
perceptions regarding women’s interests.131 This was particularly true in the securities
cases where many of the plaintiffs were women who had worked long and uninterrupted
careers and were earning high incomes even while they were restricted in their
opportunities.132 The experience of these women should have provided an important
counterweight to the underlying stereotypes but their failure to do so sheds light on some
of the other factors that contributed to the hostility so many of the women faced,
including a desire by men to preserve their workplace advantages, an issue that will be
discussed in more detail shortly.
The grocery store cases, as well as the cases against Home Depot and Wal-Mart,
are more difficult to label, as neither case included allegations of harassment but instead
they seem to be cases involving common stereotypes regarding women as mothers and
men as breadwinners. All of the retail cases included allegations that the companies
would ask women about their husband’s jobs or salaries, and most also included claims
131

Occasionally, as in the Publix litigation, the company would survey some of its female employees
as a means of providing evidence during the litigation. See Shores v. Publix Super Markets, No. 95-1162,
CIV-T-28(E), 1996 Westlaw 407850, at *7 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (detailing study). But outside of the litigation,
none of the companies had investigated the reason for their segregated workforces. See, e.g., Stender v.
Lucky Stores, 803 F. Supp. at 292 (observing that Lucky’s had never conducted a survey to guage women’s
actual interests).
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See text accompanying notes 23 and 52 , supra.
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that management justified paying men higher wages because of their family
commitments.133 Stereotyping also appeared to be at work in the particular assignments –
for example, keeping women off the sales floor at Home Depot and out of the meat
department in the grocery stores.
Despite the lack of apparent hostility towards women, these cases seem best
classified as involving claims of overt rather than subtle discrimination. Certainly the
claims regarding women’s husbands or their commitments were not subtle in nature, and
there was nothing about the structure of the workplace that necessarily disadvantaged
women. Retail hours can be flexible, and the various shifts that are designed around the
lengthy hours the stores are open can likewise enable women to work when their children
are at school or their husbands are at home. Indeed, the often obsessive focus on the need
for flexible work conditions ignores the flexibility that higher wages and greater
management responsibility can bring.134 Instead of structural concerns, it was again the
employers’ perceptions of women’s interests that likely caused the disparities – their
perception that women would not be willing to move to different stores or to work at
night, neither of which was substantiated to any degree in the cases.135 In this respect,
these cases resemble the famed case brought against Sears Roebuck, a case in which
women were typically assigned to salaried rather than commission positions and one in
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See text accompanying note 40 supra; see also More than 900 Women File Claims of Bias in Merrill
Lynch Case, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1999, at C2 (noting that “women were told they earned less than men
because their husbands could support them.”); Reed, supra note 39, at 35 (Merrill Lynch broker Anne
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which the employer successfully defended the case by claiming that the assignments were
the product of women’s interests rather than discriminatory practices.136
Although the cases discussed earlier are largely inconsistent with the subtle
discrimination story, they are consistent with a story regarding segregation in the labor
market that has been well documented. Much has been written regarding the segregated
nature of the workforce, in particular about how segregation affects the gender wage gap,
and while there is little consensus regarding how much of the gap can be attributed to sex
segregation, few can doubt the extreme levels of segregation that continue to exist in the
labor market.137 Moreover, the progress that has been made since 1970 when women
began to enter the workforce in less traditional occupations and today has been modest,
and by almost any measure, far less than was expected thirty years ago when the civil
rights laws began to be enforced.138

For example, women accounted for 97.6% of all

secretaries in 1970 and by 2000 the figure was 98.0%. In 2000, women still comprised
92.8% of registered nurses, 98.5% of Pre-K and kindergarten teachers, but only 3.8% of
firefighters and 3.7% of airline pilots.139 A recent report indicated that only 1 in five

136

See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff’d 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.

1988).
137

An “index of segregation” has been developed to measure the level of occupational segregation that
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teachers are men, which marked a new forty-year low.140 It would be easy to continue
the list but the point has been widely recognized; what has been less recognized is the
way in which contemporary discrimination preserves the occupational structure and just
how difficult it can be for women who are entering traditionally male professions
whether those professions are at the top of the pay scale (securities) or fall in the middle
(miners) or tend towards the bottom (retail). In each instance, women continue to face
substantial barriers to successful integration, and are clearly left with a different set of
choices than their male counterparts.
B. Preserving Male Norms.
The cases discussed previously are also consistent with a theory of sexual
harassment recently advanced by a number of feminist legal scholars. In an important
article, Professor Kathryn Abrams has suggested that we should view sexual harassment
as an attempt by men to preserve male norms in the workplace.141 Abrams defines sexual
harassment “as a phenomenon that serves to preserve male control and entrench
masculine norms in the workplace.”142 In this way, she argues, “[s]exual harassment
feminizes women by throwing them off balance in the work environment and depriving
them of opportunities the workplace could provide to chart new, more independent
courses and to explore different conceptions of self.”143 Under this perspective, sexual
harassment is less about sexual desire, and more about preserving male norms that
effectively exclude women from participation. Professor Vicki Schultz has advanced a
140
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(“Two out of 10 teachers are men, the lowest figure in 40 years, a survey by the National Education
Association has found.”).
141
See Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169
(1998).
142
Id. at 1172.
143
Id. at 1219.

35

similar theory, arguing that the judicial focus on sexual acts as the paramount form of
sexual harassment obscures the many other ways in which male dominance is
preserved.144
The theories developed by Abrams and Schultz are typically contrasted with what
is known as the social dominance theory, around which much of the doctrine relating to
sexual harassment has been developed. Under this theory, sexual harassment in the
workplace is about sexual desire and power, and it is typically defined with reference to
sexual activity.145 Workplace surveys that seek to measure the extent of sexual
harassment almost always define harassment in precisely this way.146
Although these theories are not necessarily incompatible and both approaches
accurately describe behavior that occurs within the workplace, the theories that focus on
preserving male norms better capture much of the behavior delineated in the cases
discussed earlier. It is perhaps easiest to illustrate the relevance of sexual harassment
144

See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998). More
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theory by looking to the securities cases. These cases included very little overt sexual
advances or behavior – men were not interested in their female counterparts as sexual
objects but were instead intent on creating an environment that conveyed express hostility
to women, making it clear through their actions that women were neither wanted nor
would they necessarily be tolerated. The “boom boom” room was one manifestation of
this exclusion. This was a place that was literally off-limits to women and where men
could go for male-bonding rituals that perhaps offered the comfort of knowing that the
workplace had not changed from the days when the professional staff was exclusively
male.
The same was true in the grocery store cases where the job assignments made
clear that women were seen asmarginal employees, and that their primary fidelity should
be to their families. While women were allowed to perform many of the necessary
menial tasks, such as working the cash registers, they would not be accepted in the higher
echelons of management because these were rungs preserved for men.147 The grocery
store cases rarely contained the sensational allegations of harassment or boorish behavior
that was central to the securities cases, but the means of exclusion were designed to
preserve male workplace norms, and equally important, they were designed to preserve
gender norms outside of the workplace by emphasizing women’s commitments to their
family over their commitments to work.
This latter point is important to emphasize given that we often focus on the ways
in which harassing behavior is tied to preserving norms within the workplace, but it does
147
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much more than that. By treating women as marginal employees, and by assuming that
they will not want to relocate or work the long hours necessary to move forward, the
workplace norms reach far beyond the workplace to help maintain stereotypes and gender
roles in the home as well. In this way, the gender norms preserve men’s status both in
and outside the workplace.148 The perpetuation of gendered parenting reaffirms these
roles as women have found that, despite the pervasive rhetoric propounding equal
parenting, they still perform the majority of work in the home, whether caring for
children or the home itself.149
We see the same interactions at work in the sexual harassment cases, none of
which involved sexual overtures or advances as a central part of the claims. Although
there was overtly sexual behavior in some of the cases, most of even the sexual behavior
was too crude to be taken as anything other than an attempt to harass rather than to
seduce. The behavior at issue in Mitsubishi, Eleveth Mines, Ford Motors and the other
class action harassment cases, involved disciplining women’s entry into male-dominated
jobs as a way of preserving the norms that had previously existed. This was not behavior
designed to have women act more like men, but it was instead intended to preserve a
male space that excluded women regardless of how “male” their behavior may have been,
or how willing women might have been to fit in.150 Many of the women in the securities
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cases were aggressive, hard-working and high-earning, and yet they were still subjected
to harassing and exclusionary behavior. As the Court of Appeals explained in its
decision in the Eveleth Mines case, much of the workplace harassment was designed “to
destroy the human psyche as well as the human spirit” of the plaintiffs.151
This desire to preserve male norms reflects two often unacknowledged social
phenomena. For men, preserving male norms can be defined, at least in one sense, as
rational behavior. Studies continually demonstrate that female-dominated jobs suffer a
wage penalty, and that those positions dominated by men receive a substantial wage
premium.152 Beyond the economic advantages, sociologists Susan Fiske and Peter Glick
have observed that men may feel threatened by the introduction of women into maledominated jobs because “jobs that are dominated by men are seen as requiring traits that
distinguish men as superior to women.”153 Breaking down these barriers may threaten
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men’s own sense of their selves, while likewise threatening their substantial occupational
status and accompanying advantages independent of the earnings premium.154
This perceived threat directly relates to another lurking explanation for why men
may seek to preserve male norms in the workplace through practices of hostility and
exclusion. Despite our professed allegiance to a world of sexual equality, there remains a
deep social ambivalence regarding exactly what such a world would look like. Polls
consistently demonstrate a curious nostalgia for returning to the sex roles characteristic of
the 1950s where many women tended to stay home after marriage and certainly after
having children. A 1996 poll by the Washington Post found that nearly forty percent of
the respondents desired to return to traditional home life where the wife worked only
inside the home.155 Other polls have largely replicated these findings. For example, in a
2000 survey conducted by International Communications Research, 69% of 18 to 30 year
olds and 80% of 45 to 60 year olds agreed with the statement: “It may be necessary for
mothers to be working because the family needs the money, but it would be better if she
could stay home and take care of the house and children.”156 A recent poll conducted by
the nonprofit Public Agenda asked respondents to choose between creating public
policies that would allow one family member to stay home and policies intended to
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provide more public child care as a way to help families balance their work and family
obligations. Sixty-two percent of the respondents chose policies that would enable one
parent to stay home.157 In reviewing the literature on housework, Virginia Valian found
that there was a consensus between men and women that “women should do most of the
housework.”158
This societal ambivale nce has recently found its way into legal scholarship in the
form of an emphasis on the importance of caretaking to women. Joan Williams, Martha
Fineman and other feminist legal scholars have recently advocated creating more public
policies that would facilitate women’s caretaking roles.159 These policies might include
public subsidies for caretaking, limits on hours worked and the creation of more flexible
jobs that would presumably be more family friendly if not necessarily more career
friendly. I, and others, have written critically of this trend, and I will not rehash those
arguments here, other than to say that this turn towards caretaking represents a substantial
rethinking of what exactly sex equality means.160 My sense is that this rethinking is
borne largely out of frustration with the limited progress that has been made towards
equal parenting, and the ways in which women’s entry in the workplace has not
necessarily resulted in more of a sharing of the work in the home.161 Nevertheless, it
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seems to reflect our societal ambivalence toward breaking down gender stereotypes in a
way that might be transformative.162
The societal view that it would be best for women to remain home with their
children are plainly reflected in the class action cases. Every reported case included
statements from management officials that women would be paid less than men because
they did not have a family to support, and often these statements were accompanied by
blanket declarations that women were not appropriate for management positions because
of their family responsibilities.163 The class action against the rental company, Rent-ACenter, provides an extreme example of such behavior. In that case, which subsequently
settled for $47 million, one regional director was quoted as saying, “I have never had one
female store manager working for me and have never promoted a woman,” while another
stated that “Women should be home taking care of their husbands and children, chained
to the stove, not working in my store.”164
own power, given that the realm of caretaking has been one of the areas where women have been able to
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In one respect, it is not all that difficult to understand why men might want to try
to preserve workplace norms in which they both dominate and prosper, but it is more
difficult to understand why employers would tolerate these efforts. Excluding women
from the workplace has the potential to be economically inefficient insofar as the firm
would be excluding productive employees for noneconomic reasons. Economic theory
suggests that firms will eschew such behaviors, or that nondiscriminatory firms would
provide a disciplining force for the market by hiring the excluded workers and thus
lowering labor costs.165 Yet, these cases make clear that inefficient exclusion and
harassment frequently occur even in sophisticated workplaces, and it is a serious puzzle
why this behavior persists, particularly at levels that approach industry-wide patterns of
discrimination such as in the securities and grocery industries.
It is possible that the discriminatory practices discussed in this article are efficient
in the sense that the firms gain more in productivity from their male employees than was
lost by the exclusion or harassment of female employees. This might occur if the most
productive male employees gravitate towards firms with a culture that permits male
dominance. It may also be that these male employees are willing to forego salary in
return for working in such a workplace culture, that these workers gain greater utility
from a male-dominated environment than they might from higher salaries. In other
words, male brokers would effectively agree to work for Smith Barney rather than one of
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its competitors precisely because male norms were preserved in one but not the other, or
that in the grocery stores, men would only agree to begin their careers at the bottom of
the firm ladder to the extent they would not have to compete, or conceivably work, with
women.
For this to be the case, men would have to be substantially more productive than
even the best female employees, and there is certainly no reason to assume, absent some
proof, that this is the case. On the contrary, a number of published studies demonstrate
that women are no less productive than their male counterparts.166 There is, however,
some support for the notion that homogenous work groups are more productive than
heterogenous groups,167 and it may be that management’s tolerance for the practices can
be defended in this manner. Yet, the evidence in support of the homogeneity thesis is
limited and mixed, and there is little about the evidence that could be described as
compelling.168 Moreover, if true, this thesis could not defend the harassing behavior at
issue in so many of the cases, but instead might be consistent with discriminatory
assignments or promotions.
There is one other possibility that might justify the exclusionary practices based
on an efficiency rationale. Some of the discriminatory behavior might be consistent with
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customer desires or expectations, and in this way customer discrimination might help
explain why the practices persist.169 Customers might prefer men at the meat counter,
men handling their financial matters or makingtheir automobiles, but simply to state this
proposition is to reveal its limits. A majority of shoppers are women, an increasing
number of investors are likewise women, and it seems unlikely that they would have a
strong preference for dealing exclusively with men, just as it seems quite unlikely that
anyone would particularly care who assembled automobiles (or cut meat or handled the
vegetables).170 And as was true with the notion of women’s preferences, no company has
produced any data to support the notion that customer discrimination helps explain the
discriminatory policies. Of course, this might be because customer discrimination has
not been accepted as a legal justification for discriminatory policies,171 but it also seems
that more likely assumed customer preferences, rather than actual preferences, underlie
management acceptance. Indeed, it seems entirely implausible that these practices can be
defended on an efficiency basis but instead they appear to indicate that employers are
willing to forego profits in order to tolerate discriminatory practices despite their effects
on the firm’s profitability.
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Rather than focusing on these explanations, management’s inability to root out
inefficient practices likely stems from management’s own perceptions and biases,
perceptions and biases that often mirror those of their male employees. Certainly this
seems true of all of the cases discussed in this article – the behavior described in the
securities, grocery store and harassment cases all had lengthy pedigrees and originated
during a time when the workplaces were exclusively male. Boorish behavior denigrating
women was, for many, the norm, and not seen as something that required change but was
rather part of the camaraderie of the workplace. In the grocery industry, the fact that
management was comprised almost exclusively of men appeared normal, and was
consistent with the gender schema that dominated the workplace. More than anything
else, the explanations offered by management and others that women were not interested
in the demands that came with management opportunities helped fit the reality to the
perceptions rather than aligning the perceptions with reality.
In this way, the gendered nature of institutions becomes invisible because it is
seen as the natural order of things. Joan Acker has written about the way in which gender
infiltrates organizations and its processes, noting that “[m]anagers’ decisions often
initiate gender divisions, and organizational practices maintain them.”172 She contends
that gendered nature of institutions is obscured because the organization is theorized in
gender-neutral terms.173 She concludes, “Understanding how the appearance of gender
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neutrality is maintained in the face of overwhelming evidence of gendered structures is
an important part of analyzing gendered institutions.”174
Theories of social psychology also help us understand why sex-based
discriminatory practices can persist even where they are demonstrably inefficient.175 To
the extent the discriminatory practices are left over from an era of exclusively male
workplaces, management may not have seen any need to change what they had always
done, and what had been perceived to work in the past. This fidelity to past practices,
common to organizational structures, may have likewise enabled firms to discount the
complaints that arose from the female employees.
Indeed, in an era of perceived hyperregulation of the workplace, where all firms
now have sexual harassment policies and many enforce them vigorously,176 one of the
most puzzling aspects of the class action cases is why the complaints were consistently
ignored. For example, in the Smith Barney case, the complaints of Pamela Martens fell
upon deaf ears, even though a representative from the corporate office did make a token
appearance to observe the office after the initial complaints.177 The complaints that were
raised would have been relatively easy to investigate, which was true of most the
securities cases, and yet in none of the cases did the firms perform any substantial
investigation before a lawsuit was filed.178 In some instances, like the Smith Barney
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case, the company may have been trying to protect a powerful, and profitable, male
manager but, even in that case, the strategy ultimately failed as once the lawsuit was
filed, the manager at the center of the controversy quietly left the firm.179
The grocery store cases, which began nearly thirty years ago, provide another
perplexing example of corporate indifference to gender inequality within the firm. The
lack of women in management positions – as well as the lack of women in positions that
might lead to management – was plainly visible to anyone who bothered to look, as
evidenced by the plaintiffs’ practice of collecting data by viewing photographs of
managers hanging in stores.180 Home Depot and Wal-Mart certainly must have known of
their assignment patterns, and a walk through virtually any of their stores would have
confirmed that women were working primarily at cash registers rather than on the sales
floors or in management positions.181 The harassment uncovered by the EEOC in the
Mitsubishi case was so pervasive that it could not have gone unnoticed by management
level officials, and the same appears to be true for the other cases involving patterns of
sexual harassment.
As noted, some of the managements’ tolerance for the behavior may reflect an
implicit calculus of the value of the female employees when compared to the male
employees. One notable example involved the difficulty of Pamela Martens finding new
employment after she was fired by Smith Barney. Ms. Martens had a substantial
to complain to the superintendent noticed a picture of a vagina above his desk with the words, “Miners do it
better in the bush.” See Jon Tevlin, The Eveleth Mines Case, STAR TRIBUNE, Nov. 29, 1998, at A8.
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portfolio of business but firms were reluctant to hire her presumably because they viewed
her as a trouble maker who might alienate male employees.182 Beyond this kind of rough
calculus, another reason the firms tolerated such exclusionary practices, has to do with
the stereotypes that undergird the very practices at issue. This is particularly true in these
industries that are perpetuating past practices given that those practices will be seen as the
norm, and because they are the norm, they will also be assumed to be efficient, given that
efficiency is the underlying mantra of business practices. Without undertaking an effort
to determine whether the practices are efficient, firms will persist with the practices they
have always used. Management’s stereotypes about women, however, will often
preclude taking the step necessary to evaluate their practices. If the managers begin with
the assumption that women are not “tough enough” to be brokers, will not be willing to
move to take advantage of promotional opportunities, or if they assume that women want
to work part-time and are likely to leave the workplace for extended periods to have and
care for children, then there will be no reason to examine the existing practices, at least
without some shocking event, or without perhaps a sense that they are falling behind
competitors because of their practices.183 This will be particularly true when there is
some behavior that is congruent with management expectations. The social psychology
literature explains that one of the reasons stereotypes are so resistant to change is the
human tendency to emphasize stereotype consistent behavior while discounting behavior
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that is inconsistent with our gender schemas.184 This is no less true of senior
management than it is of employees or mid-level managers.
The patterns of exclusion are even more difficult to change given that they are
reinforced by the social ambivalence regarding the role of women in the labor market that
was described above.185 Although this ambivalence often lurks below the surface, the
social signals are not hard to detect, and those signals likely impose a constraint on
change, creating what Alice Kessler-Harris refers to as the “tenacity of the gendered
imagination.”186
IV. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
There remains a serious undercurrent of hostility to women in the workplace that
is reflected in the class action cases that have arisen over the last decade and which
involve overt acts of hostility towards women with an intent to preserve the male norms
that have persisted despite our national pledges of gender equality. The persistence of
these cases also help explain why we have not made more progress towards integrating
the workplace, and why the labor market remains so deeply segregated by sex. This is
not to suggest that all of the gender inequities we observe result from intentional acts of
discrimination – it is important to note that no one theory of discrimination, no one theory
of the workplace, can adequately explain what we observe. Rather than a single theory,
we should look to many different theories and explanations to help us piece together the
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puzzle that gender inequality in the workplace remains.187 Intentional discrimination
remains a critical piece of the puzzle.
At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that womens’ experience in the
workplace has not changed as much as is often stated or hoped. Moreover, this is not
simply a result of institutional factors, of difficulties women may have in balancing their
various commitments, or of their preferences, but the inequality is deeply grounded in
gender stereotypes and assumptions about women’s interests – gender stereotypes and
assumptions that reflect views that we typically associate with a different era. One
problem with the subtle discrimination literature is its tendency to remove the blame for
persistent inequalities from the actors who are responsible for the actions that produce
those inequalities, shifting the blame instead to amorphous institutions or the purported
benign actions of well-intentioned individuals. Most of the behavior described in this
article can only be seen as subtle if that term is used to encompass any behavior that is
not accompanied by overt statements of hostility to women, but that would be a curious
definition of subtle discrimination, particularly in the twenty-first century when such
statements are thankfully quite rare – though as these cases indicate, certainly not nonexistent. Although subtle forces play a strong role in perpetuating gender inequities,188
intentional discrimination likewise plays an important role, and one that is too often
ignored.
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This is the point at which I would traditionally be expected to offer policy
prescriptions for eradicating the effects of discrimination from the workplace, perhaps by
calling for greater enforcement of the law, or a change in the law, enhancing penalties, or
more diversity training. But that is not the purpose of this paper. Instead, I have here
sought to marshal evidence from existing cases as a way of demonstrating the persistence
of intentional discrimination against women in the workplace at a level that far exceeds
common perceptions. This level of discrimination is largely invisible because it is so
common, and because it raises fundamental questions regarding our societal commitment
to gender equality – a commitment that has always been more powerful rhetorically than
in its implementation.
There is another reason for withholding policy prescriptions, which is that I am
not at all certain that there is an easy fix or that some of the common policy suggestions
would aid the quest for gender integration and equality. As I have noted elsewhere, I
believe that the turn to caretaking represents a step backward rather than a step forward in
the quest for greater gender equality becauseit enshrines caretaking as women’s work,
and in many instances also privileges care work over labor market work. I also do not
think education or diversity training will likely move us forward, particularly since so
much of both is litigation driven and as a result tends to offer businesses public relations
more than its offers employees meaningful education.189 This is not to suggest that
training makes no difference – it is certainly the case that there are many employment
practices committed employers can institute to decrease workplace barriers for women.
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The comprehensive study and follow-up conducted by Johns Hopkins University when it
discovered that female professors were consistently falling behind their male peers is one
example of a successful course for change.190 As the demographics of the workplace
continue to evolve, more employers are likely to enact policies intended to retain and
attract female employees. But the models of change remain the exception rather than the
rule – a rule that seems far more represented in the class action cases discussed earlier.
More than anything else, these cases serve as a reminder us of just how much remains to
be done, how far we remain from our commitment to achieving our goal of gender
equality in the workplace.
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